Indiana Law Journal
Volume 52

Issue 1

Article 8

Fall 1976

The United States Court of Military Appeals - "Born Again"
John T. Willis

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Willis, John T. (1976) "The United States Court of Military Appeals - "Born Again"," Indiana Law Journal:
Vol. 52 : Iss. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol52/iss1/8

This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The United States
Court of Military Appeals JOHN

T.

"Born Again"

WILLIS*

The post-Vietnam period has, by historical standards, been accompanied by relatively little criticism of the military. Perhaps this reflects that
the United States' role in Southeast Asia was primarily perceived as a
political, not a military enterprise. The goals were never wholly military
but were chiefly political. The limits placed on the military effort were not
primarily dictated by military capability but were regulated by political
considerations, climate or expediency. Likewise by historical perspective,
the Vietnam-era performance of the military justice system has not drawn
the intense, sustained criticism which the court-martial system attracted
after previous conflicts. There were courts-martial which caught national
attention and became causes cil'bres - the Presidio Mutiny,' Captain Levy
and the Green Berets 2 and the My Lai incident with Lieutenant Calley.8
However, the general public and elected officials did not and have not
participated in any movement to overhaul military justice as a consequence
of Vietnam. Generally stated, the military criminal justice system estab4
lished by Congress in 1951, The Uniform Code of Military Justice,
operated tolerably well from 1964 to 1974. This general characterization
should not be regarded by staunch defenders of military justice as even
qualified praise. The problems, among others inherent in military justice,
of unbridled prosecutorial discretion, the lack of independent and experienced defense counsel and the shadow of command influence remain,
*B.A. 1968, Bucknell University; J.D. 1971, Harvard University; sole practioner,
Westminster, Maryland.
'See F. GARDNER, THE UNLAWFUL CONCERT: AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRESIDIO MUTINY CASE
(1970) (a vivid and relatively accurate glimpse of the typical AWOL soldier and his battle with
the military justice system).
2Dr. Howard K. Levy was convicted of disobeying an order to teach Green Berets certain
medical techniques, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and conduct prejudicial
to good order and discipline. His case is discussed in Glasser, Justice and Captain Levey, 12
COLUM. F. 46 (1969). After lengthy litigation his conviction was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
3on the morning of March 16, 1968, the civilian inhabitants of My Lai (4)in Song My
Village, Quang Nai Province, South Vietnam, were the victims of unrestrained armed assault.
Lt. William L. Calley was convicted of the premeditated murder of at least 22 persons and one
specification of assault with intent to commit murder as a result of this episode. His
conviction was affirmed-on appeal, see United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19
(1973), and after collateral attack in federal court, see Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir.
1975), cert denied, 525 U.S. 911 (1976). For an account of this incident see R. HAMMER, THE
COURT-MARTIAL OF LT. CALLEY (1971). The facts are presented in detail in United States v.
Calley,4 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R. 1973).
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970) (originally
enacted as Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1, arts. 1-140, 64 Stat. 107).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:151

although in subtle forms. On the other hand, to those interested in the
continuing reform of military justice, the limited success of the courtmartial system during the Vietnam era must be recognized as one reason for
the lack of impetus for change.
The course of military justice faced a crucial crossroads in the
immediate post-Vietnam period. The public and Congress expressed little
interest in legislative change in military justice.5 The entire military
establishment turned somewhat inward. Those responsible for the operation of the military justice system expressed satisfaction with their
performance. 6 Federal courts had rebuffed most serious challenges to
military authority and the court-martial system, notwithstanding widespread and multifaceted attack.7 The most vigorous organ of the military
justice system, the civilian, three judge United States Court of Military
Appeals,8 had lost its energy and sense of direction. In 1974, military
justice, though functioning, was adrift. With no public clamor for change,
with no foreseeable legislative action and with Supreme Court decisions
approving entrenched doctrines, continued reform of military justice may
5The Vietnam war .did result in a few proposals for legislauve change aimed at
eliminating command control. See, e.g., S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (Bayh); S. 41684178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (Hatfield); H.R. 2196, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (Price); H.R.
6901, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (Whalen); H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (Bennett).
These and other proposals are discussed in Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 1971: The Need
for Legislative Reform, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 9 (1971); Hodson, Military Justice: Abolish or
Change, 22 U..KAN. L. Rav. 31 (1973); Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of
Military Law, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 25 (1971). A major change is urged by two critics of
military justice in Schiesser and Benson, A Proposal to Make Courts-Martial Courts: The
Removal of Commanders From Military Justice, 7 Tax. TECH L. Rav. 559 (1976).
6See, e.g., Poydasheff and Suter, Military Justice? - Definitely! 49 TuL. L. REv. 588
(1975).
7
Due to the nature of the Vietnam war as a limited conflict unpopular with an
increasingly large segment of the American population and due to the general growth in
litigation, challenges to military law and authority in federal courts became plentiful. The
number of civilian attorneys sophisticated in military law grew, and some of them were
produced by serving at some point in the Vietnam war in the military. LaW schools not only
published articles and notes about significant military cases but military law courses sprang
up at various campuses. The following list of articles which review the federal/military court
relationship illustrates the degree of concern. Burris and Jones, Civilian Courts and CourtsMartial - The Civilian Attorney's Perspective, 10 AM. CRIM. L.RaEi. 139 (1971)1 Peck, The
Justices and the Generals: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review of Military Activities, 70
MIL. L. REv. 1 '(1975); Sherman, Judicial Review of Militry Determinations and the
Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483 (1969); Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and DoctrinalRestraints in Controllingthe Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539 (1974); Silliman,
The Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Court of Military Appeals, 18 A.F.L. REv. 81
(Summer 1976); Weckstein, Federal Court Review of Courts-MartialProceedings: A Delicate
Balance of Individual Rights and Military Responsibilities, 54 MIL. L. R-v. 1 (1971);
Development in Law - Federal Habeas Corpus,, 83 HARv. L. ,Ryv. 1038, 1208-38 (1970);
Note, Civilian Court Review of Court-MartialAdjudications, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1969);
Note, Civilian Review of Military Habeas Corpus Petitions: Is Justice Being Served, 44
FORDHAM L. Rav. 1228 (1976); Note, Post-Conviction Relief in the Federal Courts for the
Service-member Not in Custody, 73 MIcH. L. Ray. 930 (1975).
'The court is established by UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970). For a detailed history
of the Court see Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operationand
Future, 55 Mi. L. REv. 39 (1972).
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have ended. However, with changes in personnel accompanied by renewed
enthusiasm and fresh perspective, the Court of Military Appeals has been
"born again."
This introductory article and the material which follows endeavor to
demonstrate the significance of the renewed judicial activism of the
"military Supreme Court" through a discussion of precedent breaking
decisions, the vigorous exercise of supervisory review and the continued
"civilianization" of military justice despite discordant Supreme Court
decisions.
A summary glance at the statistics for the term commencing October
1975 partially reveals the impact of the court's renaissance. 9 From an
historical low of 5.6 percent of petitions for review being granted in 1974,
the court granted 16.8 percent in 1975 and averaged 20.9 percent for the first
five months of 1976. Of the 104 written opinions during this most recent
full term, 71 were rendered in favor of the accused, an increase from 48.4
percent in 1974 to 68.3 percent this past term. The nation's largest criminal
jurisdiction has once again become active and fertile with the prospect of
improving the quality and likelihood of justice for those members of our
society subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
THE ROLE OF APPELLATE REVIEW IN MILITARY JUSTICE

Ever since Midshipman Philip Spencer was hanged aboard the USS
Somers in 1842 for an alleged mutiny' ° public and legislative demands for
reform in military justice have inevitably led to the creation of methods to
insure a fair and impartial review of courts-martial. Midshipman Spencer's
legacy has been that no navy serviceman has subsequently died pursuant to
a court-martial death sentence. Only after thirteen black soldiers were'
quickly executed without any opportunity for clemency or appeal in the,
Fort Sam Houston mutiny trials of 191711 was it prohibited, first by general
order 2 and then by congressional legislation, 3 to execute a death sentence
without an appellate review procedure. Deluged by complaints about the
abuses of command control and excessive sentences after World War II,
Congress was compelled to legislative action.' 4 Again, appellate review was
considered a major part or key to a resolution as evidenced by the final
House Report:
9
These statistics were compiled from data provided by the Office of the Clerk of Court
United States Court of Military Appeals, Washington, D.C.
0
1 See E. BYRNE, MILrrARY LAw, 14-17 (1970).
"See Trials by Court-Mariial,Hearings Before Senate Comm..on Military Affairs on S.
5320, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 39-42 (1919).
12As a result of this incident General Orders Nos. 7 and 84, War Department, 1918 were.
issued requiring an opinion by The Judge Advocate General before a death sentence could be
executed.
1SAct of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, § 1, arts. 48 and 50 %,41 Stat. 759.

14The outpouring of demands for the reform of military justice was tremendous. For a

collection of newspaper editorials see Hearings on H.R. 2575 Before the Subcomm. of the
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Article 67 contains the most revolutionary changes which have ever been
incorporated in in our military law. Under existing law all appellate
review is conducted solely within the military departments. This has
resulted in widespread criticism by the general public, who, with or
without cause, look with suspicion upon all things military and particu5
larly on matters involving military justice.'

Perched at the pinnacle of the military justice system, the Court of
Military Appeals reviews a very small percentage of all court-martial
convictions. Its appellate jurisdiction does not extend to every court-martial
but is restricted to certain specified cases or to cases having a minimum
adjudged sentence. The court has appellate jurisdiction over cases reviewed
by any one of four Courts of Military Review 6 which in turn review cases
"in which the sentence, as approved, affects a general or flag officer or
extends to death, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year
or more." 17 Translated into numbers, the court has acted in only 32,650
cases rendering some 3,700 opinions since its creation in 1951 out of the
over 3,200,000 courts-martial during that time.
The performance of the Court of Military Appeals has drawn relatively
little negative reaction 8 and earned qualified praise from critics of the
House Comm. on Military Affairs, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2166-75 (1947). For a journalistic
account see Keefe, DrumheadJustice: Our Military Courts, READERS' DIGEsT, Aug. 1951, at 37;
Rosenblatt, Justice on a Drumhead, 162 NATION 501 (1946). Numerous committees (military,
legislative and ad hoc) were established to review complaints and make recommendations.
One committee held hearings in eleven major cities. See Report of War Dep't Advisory Comm.
on Military Justice to the Secretary of War (1946) (committee composed of American Bar
Association members; submitted 2519 page report).
'5H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
16UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1970). There is a separate Court of Military Review for
the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard, each consisting of one or more panels of three
judges each. Although Article 66(a) permits civilian members of these tribunals, only the Coast
Guard has complete civilian membership and ofthe remaining services only the Navy has any
civilian judges. The judges are appointed by the various Judge Advocate Generals and are
senior7 military attorneys.
1 UCMJ art. 66(b), 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (1970). There are three levels of courts-martial general, special and summary - distinguished by the levels of command which can convene
them, i.e., order their existence, and by the sentences which can be imposed. A summary courtmartial, which consists of a single officer, can impose up to thirty days' confinement. UCMJ
arts. 20, 24, 10 U.S.C. §§ 820, 824 (1970). A special court-martial, which ordinarily consists of a
military judge and at least three court members, can impose six months' confinement and,
under certain conditions, a bad conduct discharge. UCMJ arts. 19, 23, 10 U.S.C. §§ 819, 823
(1970). A general cou.rt-martial, which consists of a military judge and at least five court
members, can impose the statutory maximum punishments. UCMJ arts. 18, 22, 10 U.S.C. §§
818, 822 (1970). Because of these sentence limitations the Court of Military Appeals never
reviews a summary court-martial, reviews a very small percentage of special courts-martial and
can not review all general courts-martial in ordinary appellate channels.
'8 The court has had its critics, See Benson, The United States Court of Military Appeals.
3 TEx. TEcH L. REv. 1 (1971); Fratcher, PresidentialPower to Regulate Military Justice: A
CriticalStudy of the Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181 (1962);
West, A History of Command Influences on the Military Justice System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1
(1970). The gravest criticism has come from within the military. See Willis, The Constitution,
The United States Court of Military Appeals and the Future, 57 MIL. L. REv. 27, 91-92 (1972).
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military justice system. 19 But in the mid 1960's the court began to

experience aging pains both in personnel and judicial doctrine. This aging
process may have been signaled in the court's reaction to the landmark

decision of O'Callahan v. Parker2 which for the first time held that

something more than status as a serviceman is necessary for court-martial
jurisdiction. The court did not enthusiastically embrace the lessening of its
jurisdiction, as evidenced by its generous carving of exceptions and former

Chief Judge Quinn's bitter comments in United States v. Borys.2' Another

hint was the proclamation and assertion of extraordinary writ powers but
the failure to utilize those powers except in isolated instances. 2 Finally, the
inevitable consequences of personnel changes and age had its impact. After

only six judges in its first twenty years, the Court has had seven judges in
the past four years with nine different combinations.2 3 Enduring transition

periods brought uncertainty and reluctance to the decisionmaking process.
This past term may not have erased the uncertainty of particular aspects of
military law, but without question the court exhibited no hesitancy in

addressing and deciding issues.
PRECEDENT RECONSIDERED -

A

CLEAR CHANGE OF DIRECrION

Whenever a judicial body fails to follow a prior decision reverberations
in practice and critical commentary inevitably flow. Adherence to precedent
and stare decisis are cohesive forces in a jtidicial system. Although

consistency and predictability are proper objectives or goals of a judicial
system, as Justice Cardozo observed, judge-made law inherently contains
flaws and the "tendency to subordinate precedent to justice" is "in the
main a wholesome one.".24 During its most recent term the Court of

Military Appelas exhibited a rather free tendency to subordinate precedent
io its perception of justice by expressly overruling prior decisions affecting
search and seizure, command influence and court-martial jurisdiction.
As treated elsewhere in this issue's military law project, 25 the subject 6f
search and seizure received considerable recent attention from the Court of
19See, e.g., Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REV., 3, 51 (1970);
Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380, 390 (1966).

U.S, 258 (1969).
21l8 C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 259 (1969).
22
20395

See H. MOYER, JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY §§ 2-830 to 844 (1972); Wacker, The
"Unreviewable" Court-MartialConviction: Supervisory Relief Under the All Writs Act from
the United
States Court of Military Appeals, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 33 (1975).
2
3The present judges are Albert B. Fletcher, Jr. (Chief Judge, sworn in on April 30, 1975;
B.S., Kansas State Univ., 1948; LL.B., Washburn Univ.; 1951); William H. Cook (took oath on'
August 21, 1974; J.D., Washington Univ., 1947); Matthew J. Perry (began term February 18,
1976; B.S., South Carolina State College, 1948; J.D., South Carolina State College, 1951). Also
available for judicial duties as a senior judge is Homer Ferguson (initially sworn May 1, 1956;

LL.B., University of Michigan, 1913).

21B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 160 (1921).
25
See Note, Searches and Seizures in the Military Justice System, 52 IND. L.J.

infra.

(.1976),
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Military Appeals. In United States v. Jordan,26 the court overturned an over
twenty year old precedent and a Manual for Courts-Martial 27 provision
governing the admissibility in courts-martial of evidence seized as a result
-of searches by officials of foreign governments. The court initially
encountered the foreign search issue in United States v. DeLeo,28 finding
fourth amendment protection inapplicable to a search conducted by foreign
officials on foreign soil where the American officials were merely present.
Paragraph 152 of the Manual for Courts-Martial modified this holding by
applying the exclusionary rule whenever "the search in question was
conducted, instigated, or participated in by an official or agent of the
United States . . . who was acting in a Governmental capacity .... -29 In
Jordan, concerned by the "difficulty in drawing the line between 'mere
presence' and participation" and by the temptation merely to delegate
search authority to those not subject to constitutional restraint, the
majority opinion of Chief Judge Fletcher found the DeLeo standard
inadequate and held:
[W]henever American officials are present at the scene of a foreign search
or, even though not present, provide any information or assistance,
directive or request, which sets in motion, aids, or otherwise furthers the
objectives of a foreign search, the search must satisfy the Fourth Amendment as applied in the military community before fruits of the search may
be admitted into evidence in a trial by court-martial.30
The majority further held that in the event of a "search conducted solely by
foreign authorities" the government must be prepared to show that the
search was proper under the relevant foreign law and that it "does not
shock the conscience of the court."'31 Insofar as a significant proportion of
American servicemen serve in overseas areas and court-martial jurisdiction
is broadest on foreign soil, Jordanrepresents an important extension of the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
One of the authorized manifestations of command influence in the
court-martial system is found in Article 62(a) of the UCMJ, which provides
in part:
If a specification before a court-martial has been dismissed on motion and
the ruling does not amount to a finding of not guilty, the convening
for reconsideration of the
authority may return the record to the court
32
ruling and any further appropriate action.
C.M.A. 156, 51 C.M.R. 375 (1976).
See note 29 infra.
285 C.M.A. 148, 17 C.M.R. 148 (1954).
29
Manual for Courts-Martial
152, United States, 1969 (rev.) [hereinafter cited as MCM].
The MCM was first promulgated in 1898 to serve as a basis for court-martial practice and
procedure. See note 48, infra, & text accompanying.
3024 C.M.A. at 159, 51 C.M.R. at 378.
31
1d.
32
UCMJ art. 62(a), 10 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1970).
2624
27
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In accordance with prior court-martial practice, the drafters of the Manual
for Courts-Martial accompanying the implementation of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice in 1951 included the following explanation:
To the extent that the matter in disagreement relates solely to a question of
law, as, for example, whether the charges allege an offense cognizable by a
court-martial, the military judge or the president of a special court a military judge will accede to the view of the convening
martial without
s
authority.3
This power of the convening authority had been implicitly sustained and
expressly upheld by the court on several occasions.8 4 Confronting the issue
5 Chief Judge Fletcher and
anew this past term in United States v. Ware,3
Judge Cook joined with Senior Judge Ferguson's long held position that
there was no statutory basis for a convening authority to require a military
judge to reverse a ruling and overruled a set of prior decisions. The
definition of reconsideration, the opaque legislative history and the strict
construction ordinarily to be applied against government appeals led the
unanimous court to hold:
It appears to us to be inherently inconsistent with the action of Congress
in creatifig an independent judicial structure in the military, to strain the
clear meaning of Article 62(a) to the point of permitting the lay convening
authority to reverse a ruling of law by the trial judge. We decline to do
SO.36

This affirmation of the preeminance of judicial power in the court-martial
system and diminution of command power make United States v. Ware
perhaps the most symbolic decision of the court's last term.
Court-martial jurisdiction is another area in which the Court of
Military Appeals has markedly changed direction.3 7 Whereas the court had
previously implied that drug related offenses were always service-connected
because of the impairment on the serviceman's ability to perform,38 such
33MCM

4 67f, 1963 (rev.) (emphasis added).

34United States v. Frazier, 21 C.M.A. 444, 45 C.M.R. 218 (1972); United States v. Bielecki,
21 C.M.A. 450, 45 C.M.R. 224 (1972); Lowe v. Laird, 18 C.M.A. 131, 39 C.M.R. 131 (1969);

United States v. Boehm, 17 C.M.A. 530, 38 C.M.R. 328 (1968). For a critical appraisal of these
cases see Recent Development, COMA Reexamines the Convening Authority and Military
Judge Relationship; A Threat to the Judicializationof Military Justice, 59 MIL. L. REv. 215
(1973).
3524 C.M.A. 102, 51 C.M.R. 275 (1976).
36
1d. at 106, 51 C.M.R. at 279. (emphasis in original).
37
See Note, Parties and Offenses in the Military Justice System: Court Martial Juris(1976), infra.
diction, 52 IND. L.J. 38

See United States v. Rose, 19 C.M.A. 3, 41 C.M.R. 3 (1969); United States v. Castro, 18

C.M.A. 598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969); United States v. DeRonde, 18 C.M.A. 575, 40 C.M.R. 287
(1969); United States v. Boyd, 18 C.M.A. 581, 40 C.M.R. 293 (1969); United States v. Beeker, 18

C.M.A. 503, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969).
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rationale was expressly rejected in United States v. McCarthy.39 In United
States v. Uhlman, Chief Judge Fletcher and Senior Judge Ferguson joined
to overrule court-martial jurisdiction over the forgery of another serviceman's check, although the checks were themselves stolen, in order to
procure goods off post.40 Finally, whereas the court had always sustained
court-martial jurisdiction where the victim of the offense was another
serviceperson, 41 the court toward the end of this past term rejected on three
occasions the mere status of the victim and offender as sufficient to sustain
court-martial jurisdiction: concealment of stolen property4 2 and robbery 43
were found not service-connected when committed off post and the victim's
status as a serviceperson was only an incidental circumstance, and earlier in
the term, the overseas exception to O'Callahan44 was determined not to
cover a conspiracy to import heroin from Vietnam where the necessary
overt act occured in the civilian stateside community.45
The unhesitant reversal of prior caselaw including the voluntary
surrender of court-martial jurisdiction vividly demonstrates the fresh
perspective thriving within the Court of Military Appeals.
SUPERVISORY POWERS -

CONFIRMED AND COMPLETED

From its inception, the Court ot Military Appeals has been an activist
judicial body. Notwithstanding jurisdictional limitations and the lack of
express authority, the court proclaimed early that its duty was to see that all
courts-martial were conducted fairly and that it possessed authority to
supervise the administration of military justice. 46 By first filling the gaps in
military jurisprudence, 47 then invalidating Manual provisions 48 and finally
by judicial rulemaking4 9 the court has expanded its powers and exercised
supervisory control over military justice.
"3-'25 C.M.A. 30, 54 C.M.R. 30 (1976).
4024 C.M.A. 256, 51 C.M.R. 635 (1976), overruling United States v. Morisseau, 19 C.M.A.
17, 41 C.M.R. 17 (1969).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Lovejoy, 20 C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970); United States v.
Everson, 19 C.M.A. 70, 41 C.M.R. 70 (1969); United States v. Plamondon, 19 C.M.A. 22, 41
C.M.R.
22 (1969); United States v. Rego, 19 C.M.A. 9, 41 C.M.R. 9 (1969).
42
United States v. Tucker, 24 C.M.A. 311, 52 C.M.R. 22 (1976).
43United States v. Hedlund, 25 C.M.A. 1, 54 C.M.R. 1 (1976); United States v. Wilson, 25
26, 54 C.M.R. 26 (1976).
C.M.A.
44
0'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (significantly limited court-martial jurisdiction over service personnel). For a general discussion of developments in personal
jurisdiction, see Note, Parties and Offenses in the Military Justice System: Court-Martial
(1976), infra.
Jurisdiction,
52 IND. L.J. 45United States v. Black, 24 C:M.A. 162, 51 C.M.R. 381 (1976).
46United States v. Clay, 1 C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
47
E.g., United States v. McVey, 4 C.M.A. 167, 15 C.M.R. 167 (1954); United States v.
Andis, 2 C.M.A. 364, 8 C.M.R. 164 (1953); United States v. Slozes, 1 C.M.A. 47, 1 C.M.R. 47

(1951).
48E.g.,
Cothern, 8
143 (1953);
49E.g.,

United States v. Varnadore, 9 C.M.A. 471, 26 C.M.R. 251 (1958); United States v.
C.MA. 158, 23 CM.R. 382 t1957); United States v. Rosato, 3 C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R.
United States v. Wappler, 2 C.M.A. 393, 9 C.MR. 23 (1953).
United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969) (outlining requirements
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Subordinating the Manual for Courts-Martial to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the United States Constitution and the court's notion of
fundamental fairness is regarded as a landmark development in the court's
history. 50 The Manual, published by executive order of the President, had
been the principal basis of court-martial practice and procedure since the
nineteenth century. 51 Reaction to this judicial erosion of tradition and
52
executive power was cool and biting from the military establishment.
The present court has freely accepted the diminished role of the Manual,
invalidating provisions which affected the use of pretrial investigation
transcripts at trial, 53 established maximum sentences in violation of
constitutional equal protection, 54 gave the convening authority the power
to overrule the trial judge in certain instances5 5 and governed the
admissibility of evidence derived from foreign searches. 56
Previous rulemaking of the court included prohibiting the use of the
Manual by court members, 7 establishing a presumption of a speedy-trial
violation after 90 days of pretrial confinement 8 and creating a presumption
of a lack of speedy review if action is not taken within 90 days of sentencing
if the accused is confined.5 9 These latter two rules received strong
confirmation this past term, with three cases being overturned for exceeding the 90 day pretrial limit (including one murder conviction) 60 and the
61
lack of timely post-trial review resulting in the dismissal of another case.
During this term the court also promulgated three new explicit rules.
Although finding the issue of disclosing the terms of a grant of immunity
waived in the case at hand, the court announced in United States v.
for guilty plea inquiry); United States v. Donofew, 18 C.M.A. 149, 39 C.M.R. 149 (1969) (advise
of right to counsel); United States v. Rinehart, 8 C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957) (forbidding
use of MCM by court members).
5

OSee Quinn, Courts-Martial Practice: A View From The Top, 22 HASNGS L.J. 201

(1971); 72 Hitv. L. REy. 388 (1958).
" 1The first official Manual for Courts-Martial was published in 1898 and was revised in
1901. 1905, 1908, 1917, 1921, 1928, 1949 and, with the implementation gf the UCMJ, in 1951.
The current edition, revised in 1969, was promulgated by Exec. Order No. 10,214, 3 C.F.R.
408 (1970).
s2See Report to Hon. Wilbur M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army, by the Committee. on the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Good Order and Discipline in the Army (Jan. 18, 1960)
(commonly known as Powell Report, submitted by a committee of high level commanders
who found the court "not sufficiently conducive to stable procedures and consistent
of justice").
administration
53
United States v. Douglas, 24 C.M.A. 178, 51 C.M.R. 397 (1976).
54
United States v. Courmey, 24 C.M.A. 280, 51 C.M.R. 796 (1976).
55
United States v. Rowel, 24 C.M.A. 137, 51 C.M.R. 327 (1976); United States v. Ware, 24
C.M.A.
102, 51 C.M.R. 275 (1976).
56
United States v. Jordan, 24 C.M.A. 156, 51 C.M.R. 375 (1976).
57
United States v. Rinehart, 8 C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957).
sUnited States v. Burton, 21 C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971).
59
Dunlap v. Convening Authority, 23 C.M.A. 135, 48 C.M.R. 751 (1974).
6
United States v. Henderson, 24 C.M.A. 259, 51 C.M.R. 711 (1976); United States v.
Johnson, 24 C.M.A. 147, 51 C.M.R. 337 (1976); United States v. Dinkins, 23 C.M.A. 582, 50
C.M.R.
6 847 (1975).
Bouler v. United States. 24 C.M.A. 152. 51 C.M.R. 342 (1976).
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Webster 62 that the government must henceforth serve on the accused in
writing the terms of any grant of immunity or promise of leniency within a
reasonable time before the testimony is to be given. This rule was designed
not only to insure fairness but to also minimize judicial concern with
collateral issues. Similarly, the court added to the requirements of a guilty
plea inquiry in United States v. Green,63 by holding that a trial judge
should ascertain whether a plea bargain exists and, if so, review each
condition of any such agreement, assuring himself of understanding by the
accused and striking those provisions violating caselaw, public policy or
the judge's notion of fundamental fairness. The third rule, governing
foreign searches, has been discussed above as a precedent breaking
decision. 64 .
Disturbed by the recurring pretrial confinement problem, the court
pronounced general guidelines after inviting amicus curiae pleadings from
all services. 65 Under the UCMJ an individual can be ordered into
confinement by a commanding officer where probable cause exists that an
offense has been committed or where circumstances may require after an
offense is formally charged. 66 Redressing an unwarranted pretrial confinement in the military is difficult as there is no recognized constitutional
right to bail in the court-martial system, 67 no permanent standing military
judges to review confinement decisions, authorized administrative remedies
have not proven useful or effective, 68 and a purported cure at time of trial,
much less on appellate review, is dubious. In recognition of these problems
and the inherent disadvantages of jailed accused, Chief Judge Fletcher
declared in Courtney v. Williams:
6224

C.M.A. 26, 51 C.M.R. 76 (1975).

6324 C.M.A. 299, 52 C.M.R. 10 (1976).

64
United States v. Jordan, 24 C.M.A. 156, 51 C.M.R. 375 (1976). See text accompanying
notes 25-32 supra.
65
See Note, Building a System of Military Justice Through the All Writs Act, 52 IND. L.J.
(1976), infra.
66
UCMJ arts. 9(c), (d) & 10, 10 U.S.C. §§ 809(c), (d) & 810 (1970).
67
United States v. Hangsleben, 8 C.M.A. 320, 323, 24 C.M.R. 130, 133 (1957).
68
Article 138 of the UCMJ provides:
Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding
officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused
redress, may complain to any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the
complaint to the officer against whom it is made. [That officer] shall examine into
the complaint and take proper measures for redressing the wrong complained of;
and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned a true statement of
that complaint, with the proceedings had thereon.
UCMJ art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1970). The court has previously urged military defendants to
file complaints under this Article. See Tuttle v. Commanding Officer, 21 C.M.A. 229, 45
C.M.R. 3 (1972). Articles 97 and 98 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C..§§ 897, 898 (1970), make the
improper confining or delaying of processing of an accused punishable, but there has not
been a reported prosecution under this supposed remedy. See United States v. Ray, 20 C.M.A.
331, 335, 43 C.M.R. 171, 175 (1971) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). For a thorough consideration of
the military pretrial confinement process see Boller, PretrialRestraint in the Military, 50 MIL.
L. REv. 71 (1970). Under its extraordinary writ power of the Court of Military Appeals has
considered pretrial confinement cases but never ordered a release on the merits of a petition.
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We *believe, then, that a neutral and detached magistrate must decide more
than the probable cause question. A magistrate must decide if a person
could be detained and if he should be detained.
The consequences of
69
detention are too important to require less.

Senior Judge Ferguson concurred with the Chief Judge but added that he
believed military judges already possessed the powers to hold such a
hearing.7 0 The military had made some effort to establish such a procedure7' but it is apparent from Courtney v. Williams that later cases will
72
have to determine the acceptability of specific procedures.
The present court most convincingly displayed its intention to exercise
broad supervisory powers over the entire administration of military justice
in McPhail v. United States, 73 where the unanimous court ordered the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force to vacate the findings and
sentence of a special court-martial not within the court's statutory appellate
jurisdiction. A trial judge had found a lack of court-martial jurisdiction
over a forged credit application but had been "overruled" by the convening
authority, leading to Sergeant McPhail's conviction. Under the holding of"
United States v. Ware,74 this overruling was improper but could not be
corrected through normal appellate channels as the sentence did not
include confinement or discharge. After the exhaustion of administrative
remedies 75 McPhail filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the Court of
Military Appeals. Although the court had proclaimed that it possessed
extraordinary writ power as early as 1966,76 that power had been held not to
extend to courts-martial which, after sentencing, would not be reviewable
by the court. 77 In McPhail, a broader concept of supervisory review was
embraced and previous doctrinal restraints cast aside. Drawing on boastful
passages from earlier opinions, relying on analogies in Supreme Court
piactice and raising anew its congressional mandate to insure fairness in
military justice, Judge Cook declared for the court:
Still, this Court is the supreme court of the military judicial system. To
6924 C.M.A. 87, 90, 51 C.M.R. 260, 263 (1976).
701d. at 91, 51 C.M.R. at 264.
71 The Army had instituted a military magistrate program whereby a military attorney
reviews
pretrial confinement decisions. Army regulation 27-10, Chap. 16.
72
The uncertainty caused by Courtney v. Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87,51 C.M.R. 260 (1976), has
already been noted in Silliman, The Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Court of Military

Appeals, 18 A.F.L. REv. 81, 93 (Summer 1976). Possible procedures and the experience of the
military pilot programs are discussed in Gilley, Using Counsel to Make Military Pretrial
Procedure More Effective, 63 MIL. L. REV. 45, 96-109 (1974).
7324 C.M.A. 304, 52 C.M.R. 15 (1976). See Note, Building a System of Military Justice
Through the All Writs Act, 52 INA. L.J. (1976), infra.

7424 C.M.A. 102, 51 C.M.R. 275 (1976).
75After the approval of his sentence by the convening authority Sergeant McPhail sought
relief from the Air Force Judge Advocate General under Article UCMJ art. 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869
(1970),
but was denied relief. 24 C.M.A. at 307, 52 C.M.R. at 18.
76
United States v. Frischholz, 16 C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966).
77United States v. Snyder, 18 C.M.A. 480, 40 C.M.R. 192 (1969).
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deny that it has authority to relieve a person subject to the Uniform Code
of the burdens of a judgment by an inferior court that has acted contrary to
constitutional command and decisions of this Court is to destroy the
"integrated" nature of the military court system and to defeat the high
78
purpose Congress intended this court to serve.

McPhail not only contributed substance to the existence of extraordinary
writ power but also theoretically completed the Court of Military Appeal's
position as the highest authority in all military justice matters.
CIVILIANIZATION FROM WITHIN

The civilianization of military law was a phrase popularized and a
trend noted by Professor Edward F. Sherman in his leading article on
military justice. 79 Undoubtedly having varied meanings to varied persons
or groups, civilianization can be broadly defined as a process whereby
civilian concepts of justice, procedural and substantive, are gradually
adopted or assimilated into the court-martial system. Whether hailed,
lamented or dismissed as irrelevant, the military system of justice became
increasingly comparable to federal and state criminal law systems after
World War 1.80 The present Court of Military Appeals is continuing the
civilianization process through bolstering the role of trial judges and
reliance upon civilian precedent and standards.
Outlining and strengthening the role and responsibilities of the trial
judge has been a major thrust of the revitalized court which is not necessarily
surprising. The court has focused on the law officer or military judge in
the past during periods of growth in military law. 8 ' Chief Judge Fletcher
was a trial judge before his appointment to the court and Judge Perry an
active trial attorney. Decisions placing responsibility on the trial judge to
advise defendants of their rights, 2 to conduct greater inquiry into guilty
pleas,8 3 to instruct on relevant issues, 84 to assume an impartial role8 5 and to
7824 C.M.A. at 309, 52 C.M.R. at 20.

79Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REv. 3 (1970).
80
See Fratcher, Appellate Review in American Military Law, 14 Mo. L. REv. 15 (1949);
Langley, Military Justice and the Constitution - Improvements Offered by the New Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 29 TEx. L. REv. 651 (1951); Quinn, Some Comparisons Between
Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1240 (1968); Sherman, The
Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME.L. REv. 3 (1970); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181 (1962).
81
See Bodziak, The Law Officer Under the UCMJ, Authoritative Court of Military
Appeals Concept, 16 JAG J. 3 (1962); Douglas, The Judicialization of Military Courts, 22
HASTINGs L.J. 213 (1971); Miller, Who Made the Law Officer a "FederalJudge"?, 4 MiL L.
REv. 39 (1959); Perkins, The Military Judge: Evolution of a Judiciary,23 JAG J. 155 (1969).
82
United States v. Hawkins, 25 C.M.A. 23, 54 C.M.R. 23 (1976); United States v.
Anastasio, 24 C.M.A. 3, 51 C.M.R. 3 (1975); United States v. Jorge, 23 C.M.A. 580, 50
C.M.R. 845 (1975); United States v. Copes, 23 C.M.A. 578, 50 C.M.R. 843 (1975).
8
3United States v. Frangoules, 24 C.M.A. 317, 52 C.M.R. 28 (1976); United States v. Green,
24 C.M.A. 299, 52 C.M.R. 10 (1976); United States v. Harden, 24 C.M.A. 76, 51 C.M.R. 249
(1976).8
United States v. Hicks, 24 C.MA. 223, 51 C.M.R. 520 (1976); United States v. Miller, 24
C.M.A. 181, 51 C.M.R. 400 (1976); United States v. Homer, 24 C.M.A. 38, 51 C.M.R. 132
(1975); United States v. McGee, 23 C.M.A. 59L 50 C.M,.R 85f) £1975).
85
United States v. Shackelford, 25. C.M.A. 13, 54 C.M.R. 13 (1976) (trial judge
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insure a fair trial8 6 comprise the largest group of cases in the 1975-1976
term. Though reversal because of trial judge error fosters greater judicial
responsibility, the court was also supportive, commending particular
judicial efforts8 7 and insulating the trial judge from military command
pressure.88 This reliance on the trial judge is conjunctive with the court's
persistent citation to the American Bar Association Standards, Code of
Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics. The court has
proposed adopting the Standards and Code in its own rules8 9 and has
referred to them at virtually every opportunity in cases involving the
conduct of trial counsel (the military prosecutor), 90 the performance of
defense counsel, 9' the responsibilities of the trial judge92 and even the role.
of intermediate military appellate courts. 93 Civilianization through and of
the judiciary should improve military justice particularly when led by the
example of its highest appellate court.
The court's civilianization of military law is also apparent in its
improperly asked questions in front of court members based on answers received in
rejected guilty plea); United States v. Moore, 24 C.M.A. 217, 51 C.M.R. 514 (1976) (trial judge
erroneously
elicited testimony that accused had relied on right to counsel).
8
NUnited States v. Hale, 24 C.M.A. 134, 51 C.M.R. 324 (1976) (trial judge erred in
-precluding defense from litigating suppression of testimony as the product of illegal search);
United States v. Dunks, 24 C.M.A. 71, 51 C.M.R. 200 (1976) (trial judge abused discretion and
denied accused judicial review of administrative decision by refusing to grant a continuance).
8
1The military judge was expressly commended in Bouler v. Wood, 23 C.M.A. 589, 50
C.M.R. 854 (1975), for finding no basis for pretrial confinement and, although not ordering
release, recommending release to the convening authority and suggesting that the accused
petition the Court of Military Appeals for extraordinary relief.
8
"The removal of convening authority power to reverse a dismissal not amounting to a
finding of not guilty was the major effort in insulating the judiciary. United States v. Ware, 24
C.M.A. 102, 51 C.M.R. 275 (1976). At the beginning of the 1976 Term the court faced a case in
which the trial judge had been questioned by the convening authority and judicial superiors
about light sentences and subsequently transferred:to a noniudicial assignment, United States.
v. Ledbetter, 25 C.M.A. 51, 54 C.M.R. 51 (1976). In response the court suggested tenure for
all military judges and barred official inquiry seeking justification of judicial rulings.
89
Rule 12, Proposed Rules of Practice and Procedure, United States Court of Military
Appeals, presented at The Homer Ferguson Conference on Appellate Advocacy, Georgetown
University Law Center, May 20-21, 1976. For a glimpse of the military acceptance of the ABA
Standards see Hodson, Use of the ABA Standards in the Military, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 447
(1975).90
E.g., United States v. Shamberger, 24 C.M.A. 203, 51 C.M.R. 448 (1976) (improper
argument by trial counsel); United States v. Nelson, 24 C.M.A. 49, 51 C.M.R. 143 (1975)
(improper argument by trial counsel); Kidd v. United States, 24 C.M.A. 25, 51 C.M.R. 75
(1975) (trial counsel chided for making frivolous motion to delay trial).
91
The potential conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants drew comment in
United States v. Blakey, 24 C.M.A. 63, 51 C.M.R. 192 (1976), and United States v. Evans, 24
C.M.A. 14, 51 C.M.R. 64 (1975).
92
See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 24 C.M.A. 169, 51 C.M.R. 388 (1976); United States v.
Evans, 24 C.M.A. 14, 51 C.M.R. 64 (1975)
9
In rejecting a government argument that a rule should be given only prospective effect
because the lower court opinion was not published by The Judge Advocate General, the court
cited the ABA Standards on Appellate Courts for the proposition that all courts have inherent
authority to order publication of their opinions, implying this power should rest with the
Courts of Military Review. United States v. Cruz-Rijos, 24 C.M.A. 271, 51 C.M.R. 723 (1976).
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reliance upon federal precedent and the Constitution of the United States. 94
The concept of equal protection as embodied in the due process clause of
the fifth amendment was employed for the first time to strike down
sentence differentials which had been long-practiced in the military. 95 The
due process clause was used to test a presumption of regularity in military
records. 96 The sixth amendment right to compel process was cited in
reversing a homicide case where a witness was material to a self defense
claim. 97 Relying on the Supreme Court holding in Gerstein v. Pugh98 Chief
Judge Fletcher, in declaring the necessity for a neutral and detached
magistrate to decide detention questions, stated:
We believe that those procedures required by the Fourth Amendment in
the civilian community must also be required in the military community.
We discern no considerations of military necessity that would require a
different rule. 99
The warm embrace by the Court of Military Appeals of Supreme Court
precedent in fashioning expanded rights for military accused, surrendering
court-martial jurisdictiorl and asserting broader powers is in sharp contrast
to the spcial needs of the military as perceived by the Supreme Court in its
00
majority,
recent decisions affecting military justice. The O'Callahan'
which evidenced little respect for the court-martial process, has vanished in
the eight military justice cases subsequently considered by the Supreme
Court. The harsh tones of O'Callahan were softened in the ad hoc
approach to subject-matter jurisdiction taken in Relford v. Commandant'0'
and the denial of retroactivity in Gosa v. Mayden. 02 The procedural
decisions of Noyd v. Bond, 03 Parisi v. Davidson'014 and Schlesinger v.
Councilman,0 5 manifest the reluctance of the Supreme Court to open the
possibility of increased litigation. Upholding the constitutionality of
94

See, e.g., Note, Self-incrimination in the Military Justice System, 52 IND. L.J. (1976), infra.
95
United States v. Courmey, 24 C.M.A. 280, 51 C.M.R. 796 (1976); United States v. Lamer,
24 C.M.A. 197, 201, 51 C.M.R. 442, 446 (1976) (Fletcher, C.J., concurring).
9
United States v. Mahan, 24 C.M.A. 109, 51 C.M.R. 299 (1976) (the absence of a morning
report entry held insufficient to serve as a presumption of the inception of an AWOL).
97
United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 24 C.M.A. 1, 51 C.M.R. 1 (1975).
98420 U.S. 103 (1975).
9
Williams, 24 C.M.A. 87, 89-90, 51 C.M.R. 260, 262-63 (1976).
100Courtney v.
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
101401 U.S. 355 (1971) (the kidnap and rape of a dependent wife and a sister of other
servicemen which were committed on a military reservation were held to be triable by courtmartial).
102413 U.S. 665 (1973).
103395 U.S. 683 (1969) (petition seeking post-trial release from confinement dismissed for
failure to exhaust remedies within the military justice system including petition to the Court
of Military Appeals).
104405 U.S. 34 (1972) (holding federal courts can review the denial of a conscientious
objector discharge despite the pendency of a court-martial if all remedies have been
exhausted).
105420 U.S. 738 (1975) (held that military defendant must first allow military courts to
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Articles 133 and 134 of the UCMJ in Parker v. Levy 06 and Secretary of the
Navy v. Avrech10 7 signaled a return to the traditional "hands off" attitude
toward military law. And most recently, the conclusion and reasoning in
Middendorf v. Henry0 8 that defense counsel are not constitutionally
required at summary courts-martial leaves military law in a paradox
although the Supreme Court's record of never having reversed a courtmartial on other than jurisdictional grounds has been kept intact. 09
The Court of Military Appeals, certainly not unaware of the Supreme
Court decisions, persists in its effort to civilianize military justice while the
Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy and Middendorf v. Henry marches in the
opposite direction, raising and accepting the assertions of need for
differences between the military and civilian systems of justice. Recognizing the trends in both tribunals, one can readily imagine the different
results if the Supreme Court had been presented with the cases which were
before the Court of Military Appeals this past term. 10 The constitutional
philosophy of the Supreme Court majority as expressed by Justice
Rehnquist toward military law is comparable to that approach taken by the
Court of Military Appeals in its formative years - implied acceptance of
due process clause, reliance on congressional judgment and deference to
naked claims of military necessity."' As a specialized court accruing first
hand knowledge of the military judicial system and military needs, the
Court of Military Appeals developed a more sophisticated and perceptive
approach to the court-martial process. Perhaps with open dialogue'1 2 and
determine whether offenses are service-connected). The implications of this deference to
military courts are discussed in Bartley, Military Law in the 1970's: The Effects of Schlesinger
v. Councilman, 17 A.F.L. REv. 65 (Winter 1975).
106417 U.S. 733 (1974). For a reaction to this changed Supreme Court attitude toward
military justice see Everett, Military Justice in the Wake of Parkerv. Levy, 67 MIL L. REv. 1
(1975); Silliman, The Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Court of Military Appeals, 18
A.F.L. REv. 81 (Summer 1976).
107418 U.S. 676 (1974).
108425 U.S. 25 (1976). This decision was opposite the result reached by the Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Alderman, 22 C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973).
lInSee Note, Right to Counsel at Summary Courts-Martial:COMA at the Crossroads, 52
Ind. L.J. (1976), infra.

"0Different or opposite conclusions may very well have been reached in the area of search
and seizure, self-incrimination and the extent of court-martial jurisdiction under O'Callahan
v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
"'Beyond Justice Rehnquist's remarkable, and it is submitted plainly erroneous, conclusion that a summary court-martial is not a criminal proceeding (confinement may be imposed
and conviction carries all the collateral consequences of any federal conviction), his opinion
in Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976), and the concurring opinion of Justice Powell
accord significant weight to the congressional judgment of not providing counsel in summary
courts-martial. This approach is similar to the Clay-Sutton constitutional philosophy
employed by the Court of Military Appeals during its first decade where constitutional rights
of servicemen were deemed to flow through congressional enactment. See Willis, The
Constitution, The United States Court of Military Appeals and the Future, 57 MIL. L. REv. 27,
28-38 (1972). The Court of Military Appeals later shed this restrictive, filtered view of
constitutional rights in United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 28 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
"2The present Court of Military Appeals is conscious of the need to communicate with the
federal judiciary. Justice Rehnquist was a featured speaker at the court's Conference or
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certain legislative changes" 3 there could be a joinder of approach "between
the two courts. Meanwhile, the Court of Military Appeals remains free to
be the primary potential and thrust toward further civilianization of the
military justice system.
CONCLUSION

These introductory remarks have not been a case for or against military
justice or the court-martial system. That is a well fertilized debate and a
task assumed by numerous authors." 4 Rather, the reality that the courtmartial system exists and is unlikely to be substantially modified or
abolished is accepted and trends in military law should be sought and
discussed. Although one term may not yield a conclusive trend, military
defendants have reason to feel secure in a fair and impartial appellate
system with an activist Court of Military Appeals. Meanwhile the prgmise
of a greater balancing of individual rights and military necessity in favor of
defendants from federal courts has evaporated under the Supreme Cburt's
apparent willingness to accept broadly stated claims ofmilitary necessity or
difference. Indeed, ironically, it may now be that the government military
attorney and not the defense attorney would prefer a court-martial case to
reach the Supreme Court.
The United States Court of Military Appeals has rejuvenated military
justice. But, how long can the court continue its energetic resurgence?
There are limits on the court's time and the implementation of its rules and
suggestions will require the cooperative efforts of. others. The quality of
any judicial system ultimately depends on the ifndividuals responsible for
its administration, from those at the trial level to those sitting on appellate
courts. When individuals change, or cooperation ceases, the Court of
Military Appeals may again find itself floating without direction. The
positive contribution of the present court can be negated, and its enthusiasm dissipated. Thus, it is essential that constructive criticism of the court
and of military justice be maintained and that permanent solutions
through legislative action be pressed.
Appellate Advocacy held on May 20-21, 1976, and the court members have participated in
various meetings manifesting this objective.
11SThe legislative changes which have been urged include providing for writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, increasing the number of judges on the Court of Military
Appeals, granting life tenure and other attributes of Article III status to the Court of Military
Appeals, expressly making the court a part of the federal judiciary and granting the court clear
and broad powers to issue writs and supervise the entire military justice system.
'Proponents of the military system include Bishop, The Case For Military Justice, 62
MIL. L. REv. 215 (1973); Kent,.PracticalBenefits for the Accused - A Case Comparisonof the
U.S. Civilian and Military Systems of Justice, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 186 (1970); Moyer, Procedural
Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a Civilian Defendant, 22 ME. L. REV. 105
(1970); Nichols, The Justice of Military Justice, 12 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 482 (1971);
Poydasheff and Suter, Military Justice? - Definitely!, 49 TUL. L. REv. 588 (1975). Opponents
include Schiesser and Benson, A Proposal to Make Courts-MartialCourts: The Removal of
Commanders From Military Justice, 7 TEx. TECH L. REv. 559 (1976); Sherman, Military
Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398 (1973); West, A History of Command
Influences on the Military Justice System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1970).

